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dwelling is walled or not. Whether one lies down first, the suspended bhikkhu
lies down first, or both lie down at the same time, is not an issue here. As under
Pc 5, if both parties get up and then lie down again, one incurs another p›cittiya.
These three actions touch on only a few of the observances a suspended
bhikkhu must follow, but they are the only ones that entail a p›cittiya for a
regular bhikkhu who has dealings with him while he is suspended. For further
details, see Cv.I.25-35 and BMC2, Chapter 20.
Non-offenses. There is no offense in communing, affiliating, or lying down in
the same dwelling with another bhikkhu if one knows that—
he has not been suspended;
he was suspended but has been restored; or
he has abandoned the evil view that led to his suspension.
The Vibhaºga states explicitly that the first of these three exemptions holds
regardless of whether one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would
seem to apply to the remaining two as well.
Summary: Communing, affiliating, or lying down under the same roof with a bhikkhu
who has been suspended and not been restored—knowing that such is the case—is a
p›cittiya offense.
* * *

70. And if a novice should say the following: “As I understand the Dhamma taught by

the Blessed One, those acts the Blessed One says are obstructive, when engaged in are
not genuine obstructions,” the bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “Do not say that,
friend novice. Do not slander the Blessed One, for it is not good to slander the Blessed
One. The Blessed One would not say anything like that. In many ways, friend, the
Blessed One has described obstructive acts, and when engaged in they are genuine
obstructions. [The Sri Lankan and Burmese recensions read: In many ways, friend, the
Blessed One has described obstructive acts as obstructive, and when engaged in they are
genuine obstructions.]”
And should that novice, thus admonished by the bhikkhus, persist as before, the
bhikkhus are to admonish him thus: “From this day forth, friend novice, you are not to
claim the Blessed One as your teacher, nor are you even to have the opportunity the
other novices get—that of sharing dwellings two or three nights with the bhikkhus.
Away with you! Get lost!”
Should any bhikkhu knowingly befriend, receive services from, commune with, or lie
down in the same dwelling with a novice thus expelled, it is to be confessed.
The factors for the full offense here are three.
1) Object: a novice who has been expelled and has not relinquished his evil
view.
2) Perception: One perceives that he has been expelled and has not
relinquished his evil view—either from knowing on one’s own, from
having been told by him (§), or from having been told by others.

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3) Effort: One befriends him, receives services from him, communes with him,
or lies down in the same dwelling with him.
Object. According to the Commentary, there are three types of expulsion:
expulsion from affiliation (this applies only to bhikkhus and bhikkhunıs, and
refers to the act of suspension discussed under the preceding rule); expulsion
from one’s status; and expulsion as a punishment. Novices are subject to the
latter two.
1) Mv.I.60 lists ten grounds for expelling a novice from his status as a novice:
He breaks any of his first five precepts; he speaks in dispraise of the Buddha,
Dhamma, or Saºgha; he holds to wrong views (such things as eternalism,
fatalism, or annihilationism, says the Commentary); or he rapes a bhikkhunı.
The Commentary to Mv.I.60 states that a novice who breaks any of his first
five precepts has cut himself off from the Triple Refuge, from his teacher, and
from his right to a dwelling in a monastery. He is still a novice, though, and if he
sees the error of his ways and is determined to restrain himself in the future, he
may take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again and so be restored to his
former status. (The Commentary adds that a novice who knowingly drinks
alcohol in defiance of the fifth precept may be restored to his status as a novice
but may never ordain as a bhikkhu in this lifetime. Not all Communities share
this view, as it is not supported by the Canon.) If, however, a novice breaks any
of these precepts habitually and is not determined to restrain himself in the
future, he is to be expelled from his status as a novice.
As for the novice who holds to wrong views or who speaks in dispraise of
the Buddha, Dhamma, or Saºgha, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him
the error of his ways. If he abandons his views, he is to undergo punishment for
an appropriate period (see Mv.I.57-58) and then be allowed to confess his error,
so as to return to his former status. If he does not change his ways, he is to be
expelled from his status as a novice.
And as for the novice who rapes a bhikkhunı: The Commentary notes that
this comes under the breaking of the third precept, but is listed separately
because a novice who has sexual intercourse with anyone but a bhikkhunı may
be reinstated if he sees the error of his ways, whereas one who has raped a
bhikkhunı may not—and furthermore, he can never be ordained as a novice or a
bhikkhu in this lifetime. (See BMC2, Chapter 14.)
Except in the last case, a novice who has been expelled from his status as a
novice may be reordained as a novice if he sees his errors and can convince the
bhikkhus that he will mend his ways in the future.
2) The second form of expulsion—expulsion as punishment—is the one
mentioned in this rule: A novice comes to think that there is nothing wrong with
any novice’s having sexual intercourse or breaking any of his other precepts. If
he asserts this view, the bhikkhus are to instruct him to show him that it is evil,
but if they cannot sway him, they are to expel him in the form described in the
rule: He has no right to claim the Buddha as his teacher and loses his right to live
in the same dwellings with the bhikkhus, although he retains his status as a
novice. This form of expulsion lasts as long as he has yet to relinquish his view. If
and when he does relinquish it, he is to be reinstated. The Commentary doesn’t

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say how, but we can reason from the pattern mentioned above that he should
take the Triple Refuge from his teacher again.
The Commentary states that the factor of object under this rule is fulfilled
only by a novice who has undergone the second form of expulsion and has yet
to relinquish his evil view.
Perception. There is no offense in befriending, etc., an expelled novice if one
does not know that he has been expelled; a dukka˛a for befriending, etc., a
novice who has not been expelled but whom one perceives as expelled; and a
dukka˛a for befriending, etc., a novice if one is in doubt about the matter. This
last penalty holds regardless of whether he has actually been expelled or not.
Effort here is fulfilled by any one of four sorts of action:
1) Befriending a novice means making friendly overtures to him with the
thought of supplying him with material requisites or instruction in the Dhamma,
as a mentor would.
2) Receiving services from him means to accept the services a mentor normally
receives from his student—the Vibhaºga mentions accepting powder, clay (soap)
for washing, tooth-wood, or water for rinsing the mouth or washing the face (§).
3 & 4) Communing and lying down in the same dwelling are defined as under the
preceding rule.
Non-offenses. There is no offense in befriending, etc., a novice if one knows
that he has not been expelled, or if one knows that he has relinquished the view
that led to his expulsion in the first place. As under the preceding rule, the
Vibhaºga states explicitly that the first exemption holds regardless of whether
one’s perception is correct, and the same principle would seem to apply to the
second one as well.
Summary: Befriending, receiving services from, communing, or lying down under
the same roof with an expelled novice—knowing that he has been expelled—is a p›cittiya
offense.
Eight: The In-accordance-with-the-Rule Chapter

71. Should any bhikkhu, admonished by the bhikkhus in accordance with a rule, say,
“Friends, I will not train myself under this training rule until I have put questions
about it to another bhikkhu, competent and learned in the discipline,” it is to be
confessed. Bhikkhus, a bhikkhu in training should understand, should ask, should
ponder. This is the proper course here.

This rule deals with cases where a bhikkhu tries to excuse himself from
following any of the training rules without showing out-and-out disrespect for
the rule or the person admonishing him. (If he showed out-and-out disrespect,
the case would come under Pc 54.) The factors for the full offense here are three.
1) Object: One has been admonished by a fellow bhikkhu who cites a rule
formulated in the Vinaya.
2) Intention: One does not want to train oneself in line with the rule.

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3) Effort: As a ploy to excuse oneself, one says something to the effect that one
will not train in line with the rule.
Only two of these factors—object and effort—require explanation.
Object. The explanation for this factor is exactly the same as under Pc 54.
Perception as to whether the person giving the admonishment is ordained is
irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).
Effort. Looking at the Vibhaºga’s discussion of this factor, it would appear to
cover only cases where one used the precise words mentioned in the training
rule, but the K/Commentary—drawing probably on the Great Standards—
expands it to cover any case where one says something as a ploy to excuse
oneself from following the rule without showing disrespect. Examples might
include: “I’ll worry about that rule when I come to it.” “I don’t have time for that
right now.” “I’ve been wondering: Do you really think that that rule applies in
this day and age? It gets in the way of our spreading the Dhamma.” In other
words, this factor closes any loopholes left by Pc 54.
Non-offenses. According to the Vibhaºga, the only way to avoid an offense
in situations like this is to say that one will learn about the rule and train in line
with it. As the non-offense clauses to Pc 54 make clear, though, if one has been
admonished with any interpretation of a rule that differs from one’s teachers’,
one may avoid an offense simply by stating that one’s teachers taught
differently.
Summary: When being admonished by another bhikkhu with regard to a training
rule formulated in the Vinaya, saying something as a ploy to excuse oneself from training
under the rule is a p›cittiya offense.
* * *

72. Should any bhikkhu, when the P›˛imokkha is being recited, say, “Why are these
lesser and minor training rules recited when they lead only to anxiety, bother, and
confusion?” the criticism of the training rules is to be confessed.

“Now at that time the Blessed One, phrasing it in many ways, gave a talk
on discipline to the bhikkhus. He spoke in praise of discipline, in praise of
the mastery of discipline, and in praise of Ven. Up›li, referring to him
again and again. The bhikkhus (said), ‘… Come, friends, let’s study
discipline with Ven. Up›li.’ They and many other bhikkhus—elders, newly
ordained, and those in between—studied discipline with Ven. Up›li.
“Then the thought occurred to some group-of-six bhikkhus: ‘Now,
friends, many bhikkhus… are studying discipline with Ven. Up›li. If they
become well versed in the discipline, they will push us and pull us around
in whatever way they like, however they like, and as long as they like.
Come, friends, let’s criticize the discipline.’ Then the group-of-six
bhikkhus, going to the bhikkhus, said, ‘Why are these lesser and minor
training rules repeated when they lead only to anxiety, bother, and
confusion?’”

395
The full offense here has three factors.
1) Effort: One criticizes the discipline in the presence
2) Object: of another bhikkhu
3) Intention: with the intent of disparaging it.
Effort. The Vibhaºga explains criticizing the discipline with a list of examples.
In addition to the statement in the rule, the list includes such statements as,
“Those who master this suffer anxiety, bother, and confusion. Those who don’t
master this suffer no anxiety, bother, or confusion. It would be better (§) if this
were not repeated. It would be better (§) if this were not learned. It would be
better (§) if this were not mastered. It would be better (§) if this were not borne
in mind. May the discipline disappear or may these bhikkhus not be well-versed
in this.” This last sentence sounds less like a criticism and more like a possible
motivation for one’s criticism—a typical ambiguity in the style of the Pali
Canon—but none of the commentaries discuss this point.
The training rule would seem to indicate that these actions are grounds for an
offense only while the P›˛imokkha is being recited or rehearsed, but the nonoffense clauses in the Vibhaºga give no allowance to criticize the discipline at
other times, and the K/Commentary follows the Vibhaºga in not making the
recitation of the P›˛imokkha a necessary factor for the offense here. In other
words, the factor of effort here is fulfilled if one criticizes the discipline at any
time.
Object. There is a p›cittiya for criticizing the discipline in the presence of a
bhikkhu; and a dukka˛a for criticizing any other Dhamma in his presence, or
criticizing either the discipline or any other Dhamma in the presence of an
unordained person. Perception as to whether one’s listener is ordained is
irrelevant to the offense (see Pc 42).
Intention. This factor is fulfilled when one’s intention is to disparage the
discipline. Given the way “effort” is defined above, this factor might seem
superfluous, but the non-offense clauses give an example of an effort that may
sound like criticism but is not actually meant to be taken as disparagement. The
Commentary defines the factor of intention here as the desire to give rise to
skepticism (vimati) about the discipline in the listener’s mind.
Further action. A bhikkhu who makes a concerted effort to speak in dispraise
of the Dhamma or discipline may be subject to an act of censure or banishment,
depending on the seriousness of the case (Cv.I.4.1; Cv.I.14.2). (See BMC2,
Chapter 20.)
Non-offenses. There is no offense if, without intending to criticize the
discipline, one suggests to another person that he/she master the suttas, the
g›th›s (verses), or the Abhidhamma first, before mastering the discipline.
Summary: Criticizing the discipline in the presence of another bhikkhu, in hopes of
making him skeptical about the discipline or its study, is a p›cittiya offense.
* * *

396

73. Should any bhikkhu, when the P›˛imokkha is being recited every half-month, say,

“Just now have I learned that this case, too, is handed down in the P›˛imokkha, is
included in the P›˛imokkha, and comes up for recitation every half-month”; and if the
bhikkhus should know of that bhikkhu, “This bhikkhu has already sat through two or
three recitations of the P›˛imokkha, if not more,” the bhikkhu is not exempted for being
ignorant. Whatever the offense he has committed, he is to be dealt with in accordance
with the rule; and in addition, his deceit is to be exposed: “It is no gain for you, friend, it
is ill-done, that when the P›˛imokkha is being recited, you do not pay attention, properly
taking it to heart.” As for the deception (§), it is to be confessed.
To summarize the Vibhaºga: If a bhikkhu—when the recitation of the
P›˛imokkha comes to a rule he has violated—tries to excuse himself through the
sort of pretence cited in the rule, he immediately incurs a dukka˛a if he has
already listened to the P›˛imokkha in full three times or more. The other
bhikkhus may then expose his deception by means of a Community transaction
(see Appendix VIII). If he then continues with the pretence, he incurs a p›cittiya.
If they do not enact a transaction against him, though, he incurs a dukka˛a for
each effort he makes in keeping up the pretence. There is no offense, though, if
he is not feigning ignorance or if he has not yet heard the P›˛imokkha in full at
least three times.
Obviously, these explanations were formulated when Pali was the bhikkhus’
native language, and the recitation of the P›˛imokkha in Pali offered the
opportunity to learn the rules, along with the opportunity to feign ignorance
without telling an out-and-out lie. In other words, one could say immediately
after the recitation of a particular rule, “Just now have I heard that this rule is in
the P›˛imokkha,” and strictly speaking it would be true: One has just heard it,
even if for the umpteenth time, but one hopes that the other bhikkhus will be
deceived into inferring that one has just heard it for the first time.
However, the discussion of this rule in the Vibhaºga and commentaries
makes no exceptions for bhikkhus whose native language is not Pali.
Nevertheless, as the P›˛imokkha is available in a number of translations, the
grace period in which one is expected to be ignorant—three recitations covers at
least a month to a month and a half—is not too short a time for a new bhikkhu
to read and remember the rules in translation.
It is also worth noting that the non-offense clauses do not make an exception
for a bhikkhu who tries a similar ploy to feign ignorance of the rules outside of
the time when the P›˛imokkha is being formally recited, and the
K/Commentary—as under the preceding rule—follows the Vibhaºga in not
making the recitation of the P›˛imokkha a necessary factor for the offense here.
In other words, this rule covers the use of a half-truth to feign ignorance of the
rules at any time.
The factors for the full offense here are three.
1) Object: a rule in the P›˛imokkha.
2) Intention: One wants to deceive the bhikkhus into believing that one is
ignorant of the rule one has broken.

397
3) Effort: One has heard the P›˛imokkha in full for at least three times, yet one
persists in saying half-truths to feign ignorance after the bhikkhus have
enacted a Community transaction exposing one’s deceit. (Out-and-out lies
would come under Pc 1.)
Perception as to the transaction’s validity is not a mitigating factor here. If the
transaction exposing one’s deceit has been properly carried out, then regardless
of whether one perceives it as valid, one incurs a p›cittiya for trying to deceive
the bhikkhus any further. If it has been improperly carried out, one incurs a
dukka˛a for trying to deceive them further, regardless of how one perceives the
transaction.
Non-offenses. There is no offense if one has heard the P›˛imokkha in full
fewer than three times or if one is not intending to deceive anyone.
Summary: Using half-truths to deceive others into believing that one is ignorant of
the rules in the P›˛imokkha—after one has already heard the P›˛imokkha in full three
times, and a Community transaction exposing one’s deceit has been brought against
one—is a p›cittiya offense.
* * *

74. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, give a blow to (another) bhikkhu, it is
to be confessed.

The factors for the full offense here are three.
1) Object: another bhikkhu.
2) Effort: One gives him a blow
3) Intention: out of anger.
Object. A bhikkhu is grounds for the full offense here; anyone unordained,
grounds for a dukka˛a. According to the Commentary, anyone unordained
includes animals as well as human beings.
As under Pc 42, the Vibhaºga indicates that perception as to whether the
person receiving the blow is ordained is irrelevant to the offense here.
Effort. This factor is fulfilled whether one gives a blow—
with one’s own body (hitting with a fist, jabbing with an elbow, kicking with
a foot);
with something attached to the body (e.g., a stick, a knife); or
with something that can be “thrown” (this includes such things as throwing a
rock, shooting an arrow, or firing a gun). According to the Vibhaºga, this last
category includes throwing “even a lotus leaf,” which shows that the blow need
not be painful in order to fulfill this factor.
Such actions as twisting the other person’s arm behind his back or wringing
his neck are not mentioned under this rule, but the act of grabbing his arm prior
to twisting it or grabbing his neck prior to wringing it would fulfil the factor of
effort here.
Intention. If one gives a blow for reasons other than anger, the action does
not fall under this rule. Thus, for instance, if one thumps a fellow bhikkhu on the

398
back to help dislodge something caught in his throat, there is no offense. And as
the Commentary notes, if—impelled by lust—one gives a blow to a woman, one
incurs the full penalty under Sg 2.
For some reason, the Commentary says that if one cuts off the nose or ear of
a fellow bhikkhu in order to disfigure him, one incurs only a dukka˛a. As the
Vinaya-mukha points out, though, there is no basis in the Vibhaºga or in reason
for this statement. It is hard to imagine anyone doing this unless impelled by
anger, and the act of cutting another person would come under the factor of
giving a blow with something connected with the body.
“Result” is not a factor here. Whether the other person is hurt—or how badly
he/she is hurt—does not affect the offense. If one intends simply to hurt the
other person, but he/she happens to die from one’s blow, the case is treated
under this rule, rather than under Pr 3. In other words, the penalty is a p›cittiya
if the victim is a bhikkhu, and a dukka˛a if not.
Non-offenses. According to the Vibhaºga, there is no offense for a bhikkhu
who, trapped in a difficult situation, gives a blow “desiring freedom.” The
Commentary’s discussion of this point shows that it includes what we at present
would call self-defense; and the K/Commentary’s analysis of the factors of the
offense here shows that even if anger or displeasure arises in one’s mind in cases
like this, there is no penalty.
Summary: Giving a blow to another bhikkhu when impelled by anger—except in selfdefense—is a p›cittiya offense.
* * *

75. Should any bhikkhu, angered and displeased, raise the palm of his hand against
(another) bhikkhu, it is to be confessed.

This rule is similar to the preceding one, differing only in the factor of effort:
Raising the palm of one’s hand means raising any part of one’s body (the hand, the
foot, etc.) or anything attached to the body (a stick, a rock, a gun, a bow and
arrow) in a threatening manner.
The Commentary notes that if one intends only to raise one’s hand but then
accidentally gives a blow, one incurs a dukka˛a. The Sub-commentary, following
the lead of the Old K/Sub-commentary, explains this in the only way that would
make sense: One incurs the dukka˛a for the blow, but a p›cittiya for raising the
hand in the first place.
The Sub-commentary also notes that if an animal, for example, is making a
mess and a bhikkhu raises his hand against it, this would be included under
desiring freedom—i.e., from the mess—and so would not be an offense. This
explanation, however, would open a large loophole for a bhikkhu who wanted
to justify raising his hand against another bhikkhu in any situation that he found
displeasing. It would seem preferable to limit the allowance for one desiring
freedom to cases where one is in physical danger.

399
Summary: Making a threatening gesture against another bhikkhu when motivated by
anger—except in self-defense—is a p›cittiya offense.
* * *

76. Should any bhikkhu charge a bhikkhu with an unfounded saºgh›disesa (offense), it
is to be confessed.

Here again the factors for the full offense are three.
1) Object: another bhikkhu.
2) Perception: One has not seen, heard, or suspected him of committing the
offense one is charging him with.
3) Effort: One accuses him in his presence—or gets someone else to accuse him
in his presence—of having committed a saºgh›disesa offense.
If one makes an unfounded charge accusing another bhikkhu of a defect in
conduct or a defect in view, the penalty is a dukka˛a. According to Mv.IV.16.12, a
defect in conduct means any offense of a thullaccaya or less; a defect in view means
wrong view or a view holding to an extreme. The Commentary to Pv.VI.10
identifies wrong view as mundane wrong view as defined in MN 117, and as
classed as a defect in view in AN 3.117. The same Commentary identifies a view
holding to an extreme as any one of the ten standpoints on which the Buddha
refused to take a stand. See, e.g., DN 9 and MN 63. Although a defect in view is
not automatically an offense, charging a bhikkhu with such a defect could lead
the Community to interrogate him to see if the view warrants treatment under
Sg 10, Pc 69, or the procedures leading up to censure.
The Vibhaºga states that there is also a dukka˛a for making an unfounded
charge accusing an unordained person—such as a bhikkhunı or a novice—of a
defect in conduct or a defect in view.
As under Pc 42, perception as to whether the person being charged is
ordained is irrelevant to the offense.
The topic of unfounded charges is a complex one and has already been
covered in detail under Sg 8. Additional points may be inferred from the
discussion of that rule, the differences being that intention is not a factor here,
and the change in effort—one is accusing the other bhikkhu of a saºgh›disesa or
lesser offense—changes the seriousness of the penalty.
Non-offenses. As under Sg 8, there is no offense if one makes the
accusation—or gets someone else to make it—when one thinks it to be true,
even if the other bhikkhu is actually not guilty of the offense.
Summary: Making an unfounded charge to another bhikkhu—or getting someone
else to make the charge to him—that he is guilty of a saºgh›disesa offense is a p›cittiya
offense.
* * *

400

77. Should any bhikkhu intentionally provoke anxiety in (another) bhikkhu, (thinking,)
“This way, even for just a moment, he will have no peace”—doing it for just that reason
and no other—it is to be confessed.
The Vinaya-mukha’s explanation for this rule is worth quoting at length:
“There are people who normally tend to be anxious about one thing or
another…. If someone speaks to this sort of bhikkhu about contingencies
that run counter to the Buddha’s ordinances and are impossible to
know—e.g., ‘When you were ordained, how can you know that all the
qualifications (for a valid Community transaction) were fulfilled? If they
were lacking, doesn’t that mean you aren’t really ordained?’—even this is
enough to set him worrying, giving him all sorts of anguish. A bhikkhu
who is unrestrained and who—looking for fun with no concern for how
his friends will suffer—takes such matters to tell them is penalized with a
p›cittiya in this rule.”
The full offense here has four factors.
1) Object: another bhikkhu.
2) Effort: One mentions that he might have broken a rule.
3) Result: One provokes anxiety in him.
4) Intention: One’s motive is simply to cause him anxiety even if just for a
moment.
Object. A bhikkhu here is grounds for a p›cittiya; an unordained person—
this apparently includes bhikkhunıs—grounds for a dukka˛a. As under Pc 42,
perception as to whether one’s listener is ordained is irrelevant to the offense.
Effort & result. The Vibhaºga illustrates these two factors together, saying,
“One provokes anxiety (saying), ‘Perhaps you were ordained when less than
twenty; perhaps you have eaten at the wrong time; perhaps you have drunk
alcohol; perhaps you have sat down in private with a woman.’ Most of these
possible offenses are ones that can be committed unknowingly, but the last one
is not. However, it is close enough to an offense that the mention of the
possibility of having done it unknowingly would cause an ignorant bhikkhu
anxiety. Similarly, in the origin story, some group-of-six bhikkhus made
insinuating remarks to the group of seventeen that because they were ordained
when they were less than 20 years old, they were not really ordained. Yet,
because the group of seventeen were the instigators for that rule, they were not
subject to it. All of this shows that the factor of effort can be fulfilled by any
statement one might make to another bhikkhu insinuating that he may have
broken a rule, even if the action mentioned is not actually an offense.
The Commentary underlines the need for the factor of result here by
translating “provokes” as “generates.” In other words, anxiety has to arise in
one’s listener as a result of one’s remarks, even if for a moment, for there to be
an offense. This interpretation is seconded by the fact that the Vibhaºga to Pc 55,
which is in some ways parallel to this rule, contains explicit statements to the